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RECENT DECISIONS

It would seem then that the New York courts today as a matter
of policy will prevent any attempt by the mortgagor to defeat the
mortgagee's security by means of a lease. They will disregard the
lease and find either a principal and agent relationship as in the
Equitable case, or an assignor-assignee relationship as in the instant
case. It is submitted that the latter is the more logical.
W. A. H.
PATENT LICENSING AGREEMENTS-PRIcE

FIXING-ELIMINA-

TION OF CoMPETITION.-Respondents were charged in a civil complaint with conspiring, in violation of the Sherman Act 1 to organize
the entire gypsum industry in the area east of the Rocky Mountains
and to stabilize prices by means of patent licenses. The licensor,
United States Gypsum Co., and its licensees constituted a group
which controlled the manufacture and distribution of 100% of the
gypsum board, 80% of the plaster and miscellaneous gypsum products, manufactured and sold in that area. The licensor established
price schedules and uniform production and distribution methods to
which the licensees conformed. Held, a prima facie case of conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act is established by proof of
industry-wide license agreements to stabilize prices and control
methods of distribution. United States v. United States Gypsum
Company, 333 U. S. 364, 92 L. ed. 552 (1948).
The Supreme Court held that the evidence established an agreement to organize the entire industry and to stabilize prices and that
such an agreement is unlawful even though the legality of each separate patent license be assumed. The Court held that the control
which the patentee exercised went beyond what the General Electric
case 2 had sanctioned as lawful. The Court declared illegal those license provisions which require the licensees to pay a royalty on all
Appeals in reversing found the parties to be principal and agent but did not
disapprove of the test as enunciated by the lower court. 265 N. Y. 398, 193
N. E. 246 (1934). To sustain its proposition of the results that would flow
from a landlord and tenant relationship the Appellate Division cited Holmes
v. Gravenhorst, 263 N. Y. 148, 188 N. E. 285 (1933). See Note, 8 ST. JOHN'S
L. REv. 346 (1934) ; 33 COL. L. REv. 168 (1933). See also Prudence Co. v.
160 West 73rd Street Corp., 260 N. Y. 205, 183 N. E. 365 (1932). Later decisions have confined these cases to the proposition that the receiver cannot
increase the amount of rents and profits being produced by the mortgaged
property. See Bank of Manhattan Trust Company v. 571 Park Ave. Corp.,
263 N. Y. 57, 188 N. E. 156 (1933). Although the court in the instant case
distinguished it from the Equitable case these facts should be kept in mind in
that the courts at some later date, finding a landlord and tenant relationship,
may seek to apply the rule enunciated by the Appellate Division in the Equitable
case.
126 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. §§ 1. 2 (1946).

2 United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U. S. 476, 71 L. ed. 362 (1926),
where the court was dealing with a situation involving a licensor (General
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gypsum board sold by them, whether patented or unpatented; or require licensees to sell to jobbers at the same prices as charged to
customers of jobbers; and those controlling the prices of unpatented
products. These provisions were held to have the effect of suppressing the manufacture and sale of unpatented gypsum board, of eliminating jobbers for the purpose of preventing uncontrolled resale
prices, and of controlling the prices of unpatented products, each of
which was held to be beyond the privileges conferred by the patent
law. The Government challenged the adoption of arrangements by
the gypsum industry which were similar to but broader than the one
involved in the General Electric case on the ground that a combination of licenses blanketing an industry was an unwarranted extension
of the General Electric doctrine. This contention was rejected by
the trial court in the instant case 3 and in United States v. Line Material Co. 4 Both courts relied upon and extended the General Electric doctrine; and both courts were reversed by the Supreme Court.5
But the Supreme Court did not overrule the General Electric doctrine. In the Line Material case the question was squarely presented
by the Government's appeal, and the court construed the General
Electric case as not authorizing price fixing where dominant and subservient patents owned by two or more persons are combined. Mr.
Justice Douglas, in a concurring opinion, expressed the view that the
General Electric case rests on an erroneous interpretation of the scope
of the patent privilege and should therefore be overruled. 6 A dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Burton concluded that the doctrine
of the General Electric case was sound and that it was applicable to
price fixing in a cross-licensing situation. In the instant case, decided the same day, the Court was constrained to adhere to this view,
and so unanimously reversed the district court on the ground that
the license agreements went beyond what the General Electric case
had sanctioned and was unlawful.
This decision clears a new path for the vigorous enforcement
of the Sherman Act against those who would, under the guise of
patent monopolies, strangle our traditional system of free competition.
H.G.
Electric) and a single licensee (Westinghouse) under an agreement whereby

the former set the prices for its licensee's sales or consignment contracts with
distributors. This decision has often been criticized. See Note, The Patent
Refuge of Monopolists, 21 ST. JoHN's L. IRFv. 190 (1947); Steffen, Invalid
Patents and Price Control, 56 YALE L. J. 1, 2-6 (1946); Havighurst, The
Legal Status of Industrial Control by Patent, 35 ILL. L. REV. 495, 517-518
(1941); Chafee, Equitable Servitudes on; Chattels 41 HARv. L. REv. 945, 993
(1928).
3 67 F. Supp. 397 (D. D. C. 1946).
4 64 F. Supp. 970 (E. D. Wis. 1946).
5United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U. S. 364, 92 L. ed. 552
(1948) ; United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U. S. 287, 92 L. ed. 510 (1948).
" For a complete discussion of this point and of the scope and abuse of
the patent monopoly see Note, The Patent Refuge of Monopolists, 21 ST.
JOHN'S

L. REv. 190, 195-197 (1947).

